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RECENT CASE NOTES
assignment is the most expedient, and affords the most equitable distribution
of the proceeds from the security. This rule is predicated upon a much
more realistic premise than either of the others because it recognizes the
fact that the security was really given to protect all of the notes.
Sound reason and policy does not support the denial to a bona-fide holder
of such a note a proportionate share in the security solely because his note
matures at a later date than certain others or because his was later assigned
to him. The business significance of negotiable instruments has developed
to the place where a change in the Indiana rule would be highly beneficial in
lending more certainty to their payment in case of default, but the instant
case discloses no tendency in that direction. J. W. M.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION TORT LIABuIrrY.-The representatives of the
deceased brought this action for the death of their son, drowned while bathing
in a swimming pool owned and operated by the city of Evansville. The
lower court held the city liable on grounds of negligence. On appeal, the
Supreme Court allowed appellant's motion for a new trial, on the grounds
that there was not sufficient evidence showing negligence. 1
At common law municipal corporations generally were immune from tort
liability. However, at the present time, the courts have ruled that while
the municipal corporation is not liable for torts committed by its agents in
the performance of governmental, political, or public functions it is liable
when the toiltis-comIiitted in the performance of corporate, private, or min-
isterial functions.2  This distinction has not proved entirely satisfactory,
and is difficult of application3-a fact which is driven home by the chaotic
condition of our existing law on this subject. In granting immunity, the
courts have held the operation and maintenance of the following to be gov-
ernmental functions: bridges, 4 public improvements, 5 parks and playgrounds,6
police,7 fire department,8 charitable trusts,9 and public health.JO Yet in
many of the same jurisdictions, the courts have held these same functions
to be corporate and have imposed liability in the following operations: streets
1 City of Evansville v. Blue (Ind. App., 1937), 8 N. E. (2nd) 426.
2 Borchards, E. M., Governmental Liability in Tort (1924-), 38 Yale L. J. 129.
3 Young v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co. (1907), 126 Mo. App. 1,
103 S. W. 135: "The reasons given for liability and non-liability of municipal
corporations, we admit, are not logical or consistent. Some of the reasons
given for non-liability will apply just as forcibly to cases where liability is
asserted and vice versa."
4 Daly v. New Haven (1897), 69 Conn. 644, 38 A. 397.
5 Kippes v. Louisville (1910), 140 Ky. 423, 131 S. W. 104, 30 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 116.
6 Blair v. Granger (1902), 24- R. I. 17, 51 A. 1042.
7 Bartlett v. Columbs (1837), 101 Ga. 300, 28 S. E. 599.
8Aschoff v. Evansville (1904), 34 Ind. App. 25, 72 N. E. 279.
9 Frazer v. Chicago (1900), 186 Ill. 480, 57 N. E. 1055.
10 Evans v. Kankakee (1907), 23 Ill. 223, 83 N. E. 223, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1190, note.
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and highways,l1 bridges,12  public improvements, 1 3  parks and play-
grounds,1 4 police,15 fire department,16 charitable trusts,' 7 and public utili-
ties.' 8 From this survey of the cases, it is readily apparent that the courts
have found such a basis for distinction untenable.
At the present, in cases where the courts do not allow recovery, there is
no remedy except against the officer doing the tortious act.1 9 The apparent
injustice of a municipal corporation escaping responsibility in some of these
cases leads to an inquiry in this field. What reasons are given by the courts
for denying relief?
One of the oldest maxims of the common law has been "where the reason
of a rule ceased the rule also ceased." 2 0 And yet, in dealing with municipal
corporations the courts still adhere to the old doctrine of tort immunity,
although most of the reasons for it seem to have been outgrown. For example,
if a municipal corporation could be sued, it has been said, it would not be
able to perform its functions properly.2 ' Some courts cling to the old idea
that the "King can do no wrong."2 2 Others .have upheld the inability to
be sued for failure to perform public duties because of lack of incorporation. 2 3
The applicability of these theories to modern governments, engaged in their
varied and numerous enterprises, must be conceded to be unsuitable.
Borchard, a recognized authority in this field, even goes so far as to point
out that municipal governments might be run with a greater efficiency and
a greater responsibility if the courts abandoned the old doctrine of immunity.
And if this would not induce a greater respect for the law, it would, at least,
respond to the public's sense of justice, losses inflicted on the individual being
spread over the community as a whole, instead of resting upon the unfortunate
victim alone.2 4 The tendency has been in this direction, and the distinction
between governmental and corporate functions is being severely questioned
and repudiated. 2 5 The modern trend led by the famous F6wler case2 6 has
1 1 Sherwin v. Aurora (1913), 257 Ill. 458, 100 N. E. 938, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1116 and note.
12 Gathman v. Chicago (1908), 236 Ill. 9, 86 N. E. 152, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1178 and note.
13 Murphy v. Indianapolis (1902), 158 Ind. 238, 63 N. E. 469.
14 City of Denver v. Spencer (1905), 34 Colo. 270, 82 P. 590, 2 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 147.
15 Jones v. Sioux City (1919), 185 Ia. 1178, 170 N. W. 445, 17 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 741.
16 Kaufman v. Tallahasse (1922), 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697, 30 A. L. R. 471.
17 Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n. (1900), 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4, L. R. A.
1915 D, 1167.
'SPosey v. No. Birmingham (1907), 154 Ala. 511, 45 So. 663, 15 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 711.
19Miller v. Horton (1891), 152 Mass. 542, 26 N. E. 100.
20 Funk v. U. S. (1933), 290 U. S. 371, 78 L. Ed. 369, 54 S. Ct. 212.
21 Borchards, E. M., Governmental Liability in Tort (1924), 38 Yale L. J.
129, 134.
22 Langford v. U. S. (1879), 101 U. S. 341, 343.
23 Supra, Note 22.
24 Supra, Note 22.
25 Fowler v. Cleveland (1919), 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N. E. 72, 9 A. L. R.
131. (Since overruled by, Aldrich v. Youngstown (1922), 106 Ohio St. 342,
140 N. E. 164.)
26 Supra, Note 26.
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been to abandon entirely the criteria of governmental or proprietary distinc-
tions, and to apply to municipal corporations the same rules of tort liability
as are applied to other legal entities.2 7
The Indiana case2 8 here in point discusses neither governmental nor
corporate functions, completely ignoring such distinctions, and premises lia-
bility, if any, solely on negligence. This is an entirely different premise from
that of the old theory, and seems to be in accord with the new definite trend
in the direction of tort liability for municipal corporations. F. L. M.
DAMAmEs-MENTAL ANGUIsH.-Plaintiff contracted with defendant, an
undertaker, to prepare for burial and to bury plaintiff's minor daughter. As
part of the contract for which defendant was compensated, the defendant
promised to have a photograph made of the deceased daughter before burial.
Defendant knew that plaintiff had no picture of his daughter and knew plain-
tiff's purpose in having one made. Defendant negligently allowed the body to.
be buried without having the photograph made. Plaintiff stated these facts
in his complaint, seeking to recover for mental anguish occasioned by the
breach of contract. A demurrer to this complaint was sustained by the lower
court. Plaintiff assigned error. Held: affirmed. A contract action cannot be
maintained for mental anguish alone.1
Damages for emotional disturbance as distinguished from punitive damages
are compensatory in nature and, when awarded, they are given as a matter
of right.2 No general rule has ever been devised which will satisfactorily
reconcile all the cases where the problem of recovery or non-recovery of
damages for mental suffering is presented. No difficulty is experienced where
there has been an invasion of the plaintiff's personal physical integrity, and
the resulting mental pain and suffering is a proximate consequence. 3 This is
true irrespective of the intentional or negligent character of the defendant's
conduct. Nor is there much conflict in the authorities where such elements
of damages are allowed as compensation for a mental injury suffered from
a wilful tortious act, especially in those cases where the wrong affects the
liberty,4 character,5 reputation,6 privacy,7 or domestic relations8 of the injured
party. If the defendant acted with the intention of causing mental suffering,
2 7 Workman v. Mayor of City of New York (1900), 79 U. S. 552, 21 S. Ct.
212; Kaufman v. Tallahassee (1922), 84 Fla. 634-, 94 So. 697, 30 A. L. R. 471;
Evans v. Berry (1933), 62 N. Y. 160, 186 N. E. 203; Williams v. Jacksonville
(1935), 118 Fla. 671, 160 So. 15, 98 A. L. R. 513.
28 Supra, Note 1.
IPlummer v. Hollis (1937, Supreme Ct. of Indiana), 11 N. E. (2d) 140.
2 State Ex Rel. Scoby v. Stevens (1885), 103 Ind. 55, 2 N. E. 214.
3 Cox v. Vanderbleed (1863), 21 Ind. 164.
4 Harness v. Steele (1902), 159 Ind. 286, 64 N. E. 875 (Action for false
imprisonment).5 Leach v. Leach (1895, Tex. C. A.), 33 S. W. 703 (Rape).
6 90 A. L. R. 1175-1200 (Where the defamation is not actionable per se,
no recovery can be had for mental suffering unless other injury or damages
are proved).
7 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co. (1905), 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68.
8 Pickle v. Page (1930), 252 N. Y. 475, 169 N. E. 650.
